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Abstract: The lag between the time that a borrower stops making payments
on a mortgage and the termination of the loan plays a critical role in the costs
borne by both borrower and lender on defaulted loans. While the prior
literature uses a multinomial logit approach, statistical tests indicate that we
cannot accept the associated assumption of Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA). Using a nested logit specification our results suggest that
the recipe for delinquency involves young loans to low credit score borrowers
with low or no documentation in housing markets with moderately volatile
and flat or declining nominal house prices.
Keywords: Mortgages; Subprime; Delinquency; Default

1. Introduction
Subprime lending in the mortgage market has seen dramatic
growth since the early 1990s. The share of total originations that is
subprime has risen from 1.4% in 1994 to 18.7% in 2002. Lenders
include both mono-line lenders (subprime only) and larger institutions
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that provide subprime loans as part of a continuum of alternatives.
The securitized market for subprime loans has also been growing, with
the securitization rate of subprime home mortgages rising from 31.6%
in 1994 to 62.5% in 2002.1 While the subprime securitization rate is
still below the prime or conventional market rate (73.8% in 2002), it
has helped bring the subprime market into a form more closely
resembling the prime market (Inside Mortgage Finance, 2003).
Subprime lending can most easily be characterized as high risk
lending, especially as compared to the conventional prime sector of
the mortgage market. To compensate for these risks, which include
elevated rates of prepayment, delinquency and default, lenders must
charge higher risk spreads. The understanding of these risks is of
crucial importance to both regulators and lenders. This paper focuses
on one of the least studied risks, the delinquency of subprime loans.
Delinquent loans increase the costs of servicing, increase losses for
any institution guaranteeing timely payments, and impact payments to
subordinate tranches. Even if the loans do not terminate, elevated
rates of delinquency will impact pricing in the primary and secondary
markets.

2. Motivation
The performance of a mortgage is often characterized by
whether the loan has prepaid or defaulted, as well as the loss on any
outstanding defaulted balance. Empirical models of these events can
then be used to understand the sensitivity of a mortgage to economic
conditions, loan type, and borrower information. Estimates of these
relationships rely on option pricing techniques that allow the borrower
to exercise the option to put the mortgage back to the lender or
investor through default or to call the mortgage through prepayment.
Puts and calls can be motivated by financial considerations or by
external events. A mortgage is put, at least in its simplest form, when
the mortgage outstanding is greater than the value of the property
after accounting for costs such as transaction fees. These are often
referred to as “ruthless” defaults. Similarly, a mortgage is called and
prepaid, typically due to a drop in interest rates, if the gain from doing
so outweighs the cost. Subprime borrowers may also put a mortgage

Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 60, No. 1/2 (January/February 2008): pg. 67-90. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

2

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

when their history of paying financial obligations has improved, thus
making lower cost credit available. Beyond the financial motivations,
other factors, coined trigger events, have been identified as potential
causes of loan defaults and prepayments. Typical trigger events
include losing a job, a severe illness, or the breakup of a household.
These unanticipated events, which can be either temporary or
permanent, will likely change current and future income streams and
make it difficult to continue paying a mortgage. Trigger events can
lead to both defaults and prepayments depending on the amount of
equity in the mortgage and expected income streams.
It is important to remember that the lender and borrower
interact once a loan becomes delinquent. It is the outcome of this
interaction that determines what status the loan will be in (cure, more
delinquency, or termination and type of termination). Therefore, all
observed loan outcomes reflect a mixture of lender and borrower
objectives.
Before a loan enters foreclosure proceedings or the property
becomes owned by the lender, there is a gray area in which a
borrower is delinquent. While missing a single payment on a mortgage
may violate the mortgage contract or agreement and thus could
technically be considered a default, lenders prefer and are usually
legally required to allow borrowers to be delinquent over a longer time
period before pursuing foreclosure or alternative methods of collecting
the debt. It is this time period as a loan moves from being one
payment late, to two, and three payments late that is this paper’s focal
point. Delinquent loans consist of a mix of temporary delinquency,
which will eventually cure, and delinquency that is driven by the
standard option motivation to default or prepay.
The subprime mortgage market is a fertile segment of the
market to examine delinquency because it includes borrowers who
have already shown that they have trouble meeting their financial
obligations. Therefore, subprime loans should exhibit high rates of
delinquency and default. This should aid in identifying key factors that
drive delinquency. These factors could include both time constant and
time varying factors. For example, borrowers in ruthless delinquency
(delinquency driven by the financial desire to default) may find that by
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the time delinquency reaches 60 or 90+ days house prices have
increased enough to make it no longer financially sensible to go all the
way to foreclosure.
This paper uses a large and nationally representative sample of
data from LoanPerformance. com (formerly MIC) to examine the
monthly status of single-family 30-year fixed-rate subprime mortgages
from 1996 through the middle of 2003.
This paper is one of the first examinations of the delinquency of
subprime loans. It includes—(1) an examination of subprime mortgage
performance using a large nationally representative sample of loans
covering multiple lenders and servicers, (2) a model of multiple states
of delinquency as well as termination states simultaneously, and (3)
the utilization of nested logit in a hazard model framework.

3. Background and literature review
This paper draws from two lines of literature. The first line is the
growing body of research on the subprime mortgage market. The
second line focuses on the performance and modeling of mortgages
and specifically the delinquency of mortgages.

3.1. Subprime
Over the last 10 years the growth in the subprime mortgage
market, while substantial, has been uneven. The subprime market
rapidly expanded in the mid- and early-1990s. In 1998, however, the
marketwas hit by two events that caused a liquidity crunch (Temkin,
Johnson,&Levy, 2002). First, subprime lenders experienced
unexpected losses after high default, delinquency, and prepayment
rates occurred. Second, the Russian bond crisis during late 1998
caused investor confidence to decline. The resulting secondary market
discipline led to a short time period of retrenchment followed by
renewed growth in different market segments. Before 1998, growth in
subprime came from a rapid expansion in lending to the riskiest
portions of the market. After 1998, which was also associated with
consolidation in the industry, growth has come in the least risky
portions of the market. This segment is typically referred to as AJournal of Economics and Business, Vol. 60, No. 1/2 (January/February 2008): pg. 67-90. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and
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lending and includes borrowers with impaired credit histories that are
willing to pay a premium over the prime lending rate typically in
excess of 290 basis points (Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, 2004
and Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, 2006).
In fact, subprime lenders provide a menu of mortgage options
to borrowers with a variety of impairments. The most typical
impairment is poor credit history. Borrowers with worse credit history
pay higher premiums and must provide larger down payments to help
defray some of the expected losses and expected delinquency of these
types of loans. Another segment of the subprime market is referred to
as Alt-A, which is short for Alternative A lending. These types of
borrowers look just like prime borrowers in terms of credit history and
assets to make down payments, but they usually provide limited or no
documentation on their income or down payment. As a result, they
typically pay a 100 basis point premium (Chomsisengphet &
Pennington-Cross, 2004).
As should be expected given the impairments of subprime
borrowers, the Mortgage Bankers Association of America (MBA)
reports that in the third quarter of 2002 subprime loans were
delinquent 5½ times the rate of conventional mortgages (14.28%
versus 2.54%). In addition, subprime loans started foreclosure more
than 10 times more often (2.08% versus 0.20%). There is also
evidence that subprime lending is most often used in high-risk
locations (Calem, Gillen, & Wachter, 2004, and Pennington-Cross,
2002). While subprime borrowers also tend to have less knowledge
about the mortgage process, a borrower with a subprime mortgage is
not necessarily stuck using high cost lending forever. Survey evidence
indicates that of subprime borrowers who get another mortgage,
39.6% successfully transition into the prime market (Courchane,
Surette, & Zorn, 2004).
The growing literature on subprime lending in the mortgage
market consistently shows that subprime differs substantially from the
prime market on many dimensions. The first and perhaps initially most
curious fact regarding subprime is simply that it is segmented from the
prime market. Theoretical models have explained this segmentation.
Cutts and Van Order (2005) focus on the amount of underwriting a
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lender should do in each risk classification. They find that the most
extensive underwriting will be done on the least risky loan types.
Nichols, Pennington-Cross, and Yezer (2005) provide a different
segmenting equilibrium in which lenders specialize in either subprime
or prime lending. In their model if a lender sets lending standards too
close to the entrenched prime market, then application costs become
so high that it becomes less costly to lower credit standards and
accept more high-risk applicants. This result is driven by the costs
associated with processing rejected applications. When a high
proportion of applicants are rejected it can overwhelm any benefits
associated with the lower risk borrowers. An optimum distance in
credit quality space is then found, thus motivating the need for a
segmented high-risk or subprime mortgage market.
The literature on the performance of subprime mortgages has
focused on default, prepayment, and losses on outstanding defaulted
balances. In general, loss severity tends to be higher for high-risk
borrowers and high-risk property. These losses tend to be larger even
though subprime borrowers tend to put the mortgage earlier than
prime borrowers—when it is less in the money to default
(Capozza&Thomson, 2005). Research has also found that loans
originated by third parties tend to default at elevated rates and that
high cost borrowers are less responsive to changing interest rates
(Alexander, Grimshaw, McQuen, & Slade, 2002, and Pennington-Cross,
2003). Evidence from a single subprime lender shows that risks tend
to be higher for the higher cost segments in the market because the
defaults are more highly correlated. For lower cost segments, such as
A- and Alternative-A, subprime loans showed relatively low default
correlation rates (Cowan & Cowan, 2004).

3.2. Delinquency
Traditional option based mortgage-pricing research includes
three possible states for a mortgage—(1) current or active, (2)
prepaid, or (3) defaulted.2 This approach typically ignores the fact that
lenders are usually legally not allowed to begin foreclosure proceedings
until two payments are missed and the third is due. Many options are
available to lenders besides foreclosure to recover losses on defaulted
loans and it can take a substantial period of time to complete a
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foreclosure. For example, the main feature of a ruthless default is that
it makes financial sense because the mortgage is substantially larger
than the value of the property. But, the relevant value of the property
is at foreclosure, not when the first or even second payment is missed.
Kau and Kim (1994) indirectly discuss this issue by showing that the
value of a future default can impact whether an “in the money” default
today will be exercised. For example, if house prices continue to drop
in the future the value of default will be larger in the future, and the
borrower will wait. In a stochastic framework, the larger the variance
of house prices the more value there may be in the future, so it is
consistent for borrowers that are “in the money” to default to wait.
Ambrose, Buttimer, and Capone (1997) explicitly introduced into
the option-pricing framework the delay of foreclosure and the concept
that the decision to stop making payments is determined by expected
values of the property well into the future (at the foreclosure date).
The delay of foreclosure can be interpreted as an increase in the
delinquency of the loan, but the model treats the delay of foreclosure
as an exogenous variable and therefore, can be used to provide
predictions about the probability of default given a foreclosure delay or
delinquency time period. For instance, the probability that a loan
defaults and becomes delinquent is sensitive to the delay before
foreclosure, the loan to value (LTV) ratio at origination, and the
variance of house prices. Specifically, longer delays (more expected
delinquency) and higher LTVs are associated with higher default
probabilities. The response to the variance of house prices in nonlinear. In general, as the variance increases the probability of default
increases because the probability of negative equity has increased.
The direction of this effect can change to negative when there is a
very long delay until foreclosure or the lender has no recourse to
recover any losses from other assets beyond the value of the house.
This is a natural result, because in these circumstances there may be
time for the house price to drop even further in the future making a
future default more valuable and at the same time the borrower can
receive free rent while the loan is delinquent (not paying any mortgage
or monthly rent).3
Empirical research dating back 30 years has already identified
many of the same drivers of delinquency that have been included in
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more recent options oriented theoretical models. For instance, using
sparse data sets from the 1960s and early 1970s, Morton (1975) and
Furstenberg and Green (1974) found evidence that the LTV at
origination and income of the borrower were important determinants
of the delinquency rates. The tenor of the results are remarkably
similar in a more recent paper that examined delinquency rates in the
United Kingdom (UK) using data from 1983 through 1992. Using a
seemingly unrelated regression approach, Chinloy (1995) again
found that LTV and income were the most important empirical
indicators of delinquency, whether defined as 6–12 months or greater
than 12 months delinquent. Clarifying the role of LTVs, Getter (2003)
uses the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances to show that the best tool
that borrowers have to avoid becoming late on a mortgage are
financial assets, which can be used to cover financial obligations during
unexpected periods of financial stress. To the extent that financial
assets are correlated with down payments these results are consistent
with earlier findings. Using an exponential hazard framework, Ambrose
and Capone (2000) find that the probability of being 90+ days
delinquent on FHA mortgages during the mid-1990s is sensitive to
contemporaneous economic conditions in both the labor and housing
markets. Similar to Ambrose and Capone (2000), using individual loan
level data Calem and Wachter (1999) estimated the probability of
being either 60 days or 90+ days delinquent using individual logits,
thus implicitly assuming that the probability of being 60 and 90+ days
are independent of each other. They find that credit scores matter for
both delinquency categories, but LTV has no effect. Lastly, Baku and
Smith (1998) use a case study approach to find that the performance
of loans made by nonprofit lenders to low income households is
sensitive to the incentive structure internal to the nonprofit agency.
In short, the behavior of the lender does have an impact on loan
delinquency.
Industry reports have examined transition matrices of subprime
loans. In these reports various states of delinquency are collapsed into
more aggregate groups, all states are assumed to be independent of
each other, the estimation procedure is not reported, and the results
cannot be extended beyond the single lender/servicer used in the
report (Gjaja & Wang, 2004). The results suggest that indicators have
different impacts on the extent of delinquency.
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This paper expands on this literature by recognizing that there
are multiple states of delinquency and that these states are not
independent of each other. But, in addition to the need to recognize
the importance of various degrees of delinquency, any model must
also recognize that loans can also prepay or default and that all these
options are best viewed as competing risks.4

4. Estimation technique
Several methods are available to model empirically the possible
outcomes of a subprime mortgage loan. We discuss two of these
alternatives, multinomial logit and nested logit, below.

4.1. Multinomial logit
Multinomial logit is the standard estimator used in modeling
outcomes with multiple possible states (>2). A drawback to the
multinomial logit model is an undesirable property known as
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). This implies that the
odds ratio for any two alternatives m and n do not depend upon any
other alternatives. A well-known example illustrates a problem with
this assumption. A traveler has a choice of going to work by car or by
a blue bus. Let the choice probabilities be equal, implying the ratio of
probabilities equals one. Now introduce a choice of a red bus that the
traveler considers equivalent to a blue bus. We would expect the
probability of going to work by car to remain the same at 0.5, while
the probabilities of going to work by bus would be split evenly between
blue and red buses at 0.25. If this were true, then the ratio of
probabilities between car and blue bus, formerly at 1, would now be
equal to 2 (0.5 divided by 0.25).
The addition of a red bus alternative changed the ratio of
probabilities between car and blue bus. The multinomial logit model
does not allow this possibility. The ratio of probabilities between the
car and blue bus alternatives must remain at one. Clearly, this result
in nonsensical, because households will just evenly split between the
blue and red bus. Recall that there are equal probabilities of taking a
blue bus and a red bus. The only profile of probabilities that fit these
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two constraints puts equal probability of 0.33 on each choice. The
multinomial logit would therefore overestimate the probability of
taking a blue or a red bus and would underestimate the probability of
taking a car.

4.2. Nested logit
An alternative modeling strategy that partly solves this problem
is to use nested logit models. Loan outcomes are partitioned such as
shown in Fig. 1. Each upper-level group is called a ‘branch,’ while each
lower-level group of outcomes within a branch is called a ‘nest.’ The
IIA property holds within nests but not between nests. For example,
IIA holds between the choices prepay and default, but does not hold
between prepay and any of the other outcomes such as current. This
suggests the hypothesis that removal of an alternative from the choice
set results in equal proportional increases in the probabilities of the
choices within a nest, but not different proportional changes across
different nests. For example, removal of the prepay option would
result in an equal proportional increases in the probabilities of 30 late,
60 late, and 90+ late, but no restrictions would be placed upon the
increase in the probability of default and of current.
Estimation of the nested logit model is by Full Information
Maximum Likelihood (FIML). The probability of an outcome is specified
as the product of the probability of being at a branch and the
probability of the outcome conditional on the chosen branch. Note that
the nested logit structure does not assume that decisions by borrowers
are made sequentially. This is a subtle but important point. Consider
the outcome “prepay”. The tree structure in Fig. 1 does not assume
that mortgage holders first decide to terminate a mortgage and then
decide whether to terminate by prepaying or by defaulting. Rather, the
tree structure implies that the probability of prepaying is specified as
the probability of terminating the mortgage multiplied by the
probability of prepaying conditional on terminating the mortgage.
Different formulations of the nested logit model appear in the
literature. We use the Non-Normalized Nested Logit (NNNL) model that
is estimated in STATA version 8.5
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5. Data description
We utilized data from LoanPerformance (LP, formerly MIC). LP
collects data from pools of non-agency publicly placed securitized
loans. Static information about individual loans is collected, such as
documentation type, origination balance, and purchase price, as well
as monthly updated information on loan status. Data on loans
originated between January 1996 and May 2003 are included. The
database contains information on over 1000 pools of subprime loans
representing over 3,500,000 individual loans. For our estimations, we
choose a random cross-section sample of 100,000 30-year fixed-rate
loans for owner-occupied property from the LP database. After
eliminating loans with missing data, a database of 97,852 observations
resulted.
We matched data from several external data sources to the LP
data. First, we matched data on the quarterly change in the OFHEO
House Price Index (HPI) and on the standard error of the HPI to the
loan data by state. We then matched Bureau of Labor Statistics data
on the unemployment rate lagged by 1 month by state. Finally, we
matched data on the prime interest rates on 30-year fixed mortgages
from the Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey for the given
month and for the origination month and computed the difference.
Summary statistics for the data are in Table 1.
The monthly delinquency rate for our sample remains fairly
constant from June 1999 to May 2003. The 30-day delinquency rate
stays around the average 1.4% during this time period. There is a
slight uptrend in the 30-day delinquencies since spring 2002. The 60day delinquency rate is lower, with an average of 0.5%, and generally
lags behind the 30-day delinquency rate. For example, there is a onehalf percentage point decline in the 30-day rate in April 2000, followed
by a decline of almost a third of percentage point in the 60-day rate in
May. The 90+-day delinquency rate closely tracks the 30-day rate and
has an average equal to 1.1%.
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6. Results
As described above, two alternative econometric techniques are
available to model subprime loan outcomes. Multinomial logit has been
predominately used in the literature. Recall that multinomial logit
makes the assumption of IIA on the alternative outcomes. To test
whether this assumption is appropriate, we performed the Hausman
and McFadden (1984) and Small and Hsiao (1985) tests. The results of
the tests, shown in Table 2, strongly suggest that IIA is not a valid
assumption for this data set. For each omitted category of dependent
variable, the Small-Hsiao test unambiguously rejects the null
hypothesis of IIA. The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of IIA
for half of the omitted categories, and the negative values of the test
statistic on two omitted categories, while suggesting that IIA is not
violated, are difficult to interpret. In sum, we conclude that
multinomial logit is not an appropriate estimation technique because
the IIA assumption does not hold, and we therefore use nested logit.6
Instead of presenting the nested logit coefficient estimates,
which are extremely difficult to interpret, Table 3 presents the one
standard deviation elasticity estimates for continuous variables and
binary elasticity estimates for the discrete variables. Appendix A
provides the coefficient and standard errors estimates. Appendix B
includes sensitivity tests presented in graphical form for all exogenous
variables. Table 3 estimates reflect the percent change in the
probability of the event occurring, as indicated in each column, holding
all other variables at their means. Since these impacts are not
symmetric, elasticity estimates for both increasing the variable and
decreasing the variable by one standard deviation are presented. Note
that the lack of symmetry increases the larger the responsiveness.
However, we do not know the statistical significance of the reported
elasticities due to the highly nonlinear nature of the likelihood function.
When examining the results it is important to remember that
this paper defines default as any loan that is in the foreclosure process
or the property has become owned by the lender. Other papers
occasionally use 90+ days late or the date the distressed property is
sold (as real estate owned or at a foreclosure sale) as an alternative
definition of default.
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6.1. Impact of credit scores
The impact of credit scores is very strong and most of the
results meet expectations. Loans with better credit scores are much
more likely to stay current and less likely to enter delinquency or
default. For example, the probability of 90+ delinquency falls from
1.89% for a FICO of 579 to 0.75% with a FICO of 649. This supports
the notion that past performance on other financial obligations is a
strong indicator of future ability or desire to pay.
In contrast with Pennington-Cross (2004) we find that
borrowers with higher credit scores are slightly less likely to prepay.
Fig. B1 shows an inverted U-shaped relationship. For credit scores
below 630, the results show a positive relationship between credit
scores and the probability of prepayment. A borrower with a FICO
score at the mean 649 has a 2.61% probability of prepaying. A
borrower with a FICO one standard deviation above the mean, 718,
has a prepay probability of 2.53%. This group of loans with high credit
scores is unique because the FICO is sufficient to qualify for a prime
loan, yet the borrower obtained a subprime loan. These results likely
reflect the uniqueness of the borrowers with these loans and the
permanence of their constraining circumstances.

6.2. Financial incentives
Consistent with expectations, loans that are originated with
higher LTVs are more likely to be delinquent. Serious delinquency (60
and 90+ days) is especially sensitive to homeowner equity at
origination. The results are not consistent with the predictions of
Ambrose et al. (1997) that higher LTVs are associated with higher
probabilities of default. A loan with an 80% LTV has a probability of
default of 2.71%, while a loan with a 100% LTV has a probability of
default of 2.39%. This seems to indicate that original LTV does not in
itself provide a good indicator of ruthless default types, but instead the
inability or desire to provide a down payment indicates a proclivity to
miss payments without the intent of losing the home. It could also
indicate that lenders are less likely to foreclose on homes without
equity but instead allow the borrowers to remain in delinquency.
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When house prices are increasing, borrower equity should be
growing, making it easier to prepay and less likely to default. In the
model, the probability of delinquency and default decreases when
prices increase. The model shows that prepayment is fairly
unresponsive to changes in house prices, while was an unexpected
result.
To more accurately calculate the equity of a borrower in each
month we need to know the value of the property and the outstanding
balance of the loan. State level house prices help to proxy for the
house value, but there is a substantial dispersion of individual house
prices around the mean appreciation rate through time. One way to
measure this dispersion is to use estimates of the relationship between
the variance of individual house price around the mean appreciation
rate and time since the last transaction. We use this information to
calculate what is labeled the standard error of house prices for each
individual home in the sample. In essence, this provides an estimate of
how confident we are that the individual house price has increased at
the area rate. If we have little confidence then there is higher
probability that the borrower has negative equity in the house. This
makes it more likely that the borrower will attempt a ruthless
default.7
We do find a strong positive impact of the standard error
estimates on the probability of default and 90+-day delinquency in
support of this interpretation. Areas with low standard errors, or areas
in which we have less confidence in the appreciation of the borrower’s
specific property, are much less likely to default than in areas with
high standard errors. In conjunction with the effects of changes in
house price, these results indicate that variation of individual house
price appreciation rates and local market conditions are important
predictors of default and serious delinquency in the subprime market.
The evidence presented so far indicates that subprime loans do
respond to the economic and financial incentives to put the mortgage
through default.
To measure the volatility of average or typical house prices we
include the standard deviation of the detrended OFHEO HPI in each
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state. Kau and Kim (1994) theorized that when prices are volatile
borrowers may wait longer to default, because the value of the option
to default may be larger in the future. Ambrose et al. (1997) theorized
that the result is indeterminate depending on the length of delay
(delinquency) and the extent of recourse. The empirical evidence does
not find support for a nonlinear relationship.8 Instead, as volatility
increases loans are less likely to default or prepay. Delinquency is
fairly unresponsive to the volatility measure, which is consistent with
free rent motivations for many delinquent subprime loans. In total,
these results provide supporting evidence that the value of delaying
default is an important component needed to understand the behavior
of subprime loans.
Subprime loans are also responsive to changes in interest rates.
As interest rates drop, the loan is more likely to prepay. A loan has a
2.5% probability of prepaying if interest rates do not change, and a
2.8% probability of prepaying as interest rates fall 100 basis points.
This is consistent with the notion that financial considerations are a
driver in prepayments even for the financially constrained subprime
borrowers.

6.3. Trigger events
Trigger events, as proxied by last month’s state unemployment
rate, in general do not act as expected. Higher unemployment rates
are associated with lower delinquency probabilities. The probability of
default is insensitive to local labor market conditions proxied by the
state unemployment rate. In addition, worse labor market conditions
are also associated with lower prepayment probabilities. In summary,
future research needs to come to a more complete understanding of
how subprime loans react differently to economic conditions and
exogenous trigger events.

6.4. Loan characteristics
Prepayment penalties tend to act as designed and reduce
prepayments. A loan with a prepayment penalty is 27.6% less likely to
prepay. However, loans with prepayment penalties are also associated
with higher likelihoods of delinquency (7.0% more likely to be 30 days
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late and 2.5% more likely to be 90+ late) and default (2.6% more
likely to default). Loans with limited documentation also are delinquent
(87.6% more likely to be 30 days late and 87.9% more likely to be
90+ late) and default (19.8% more likely) more frequently than full
documentation loans. The impact for loans with no documentation is
even larger. This implies that these types of loans are especially risky.
We also included a baseline in the estimation. The nested results show
a peak in defaults after the first 12 months. The model shows steady
declines in prepayments as the loan ages.

7. Conclusion
This paper examines the performance of a large national sample
of securitized private label loans. It includes multiple lenders and
therefore provides a broad examination of the performance of
subprime loans. The results reinforce the notion that all loans,
including subprime loans, respond to incentives to default and prepay
a mortgage. In addition to default and prepayment, the delinquency
behavior of subprime loans is examined in an econometric framework
that captures all the potential outcomes for the loan.
We find that financial incentives strongly explain subprime loan
outcomes. Borrower credit scores are robust predictors of delinquency,
default and prepayment and LTV at origination is positively correlated
with delinquency. Several measures of housing market conditions
indicate that subprime loans are strongly affected by all incentives to
become delinquent and default on a mortgage. The change in interest
rates affects prepayment, default, and delinquency. In addition, we
find that loan characteristics are important determinants of loan
outcomes. Prepayment penalties extend the duration of subprime
loans, and documentation status is associated with higher delinquency
status.
Subprime mortgages represent an increasingly important
segment of the securitized mortgage market. These loans are typically
more risky than prime mortgages, and are characterized by higher
rates of prepayment, delinquency, and default. This research seeks to
explain the sources of the higher rates of prepayment, delinquency,
and default of subprime mortgages. By better understanding the
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sources of the risk, subprime lenders can implement better risk
management policies.
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1 Securities that include subprime loans are often referred to as Asset Backed
Securities (ABS) instead of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS).
2 For a summary of this line or research see Vandell (1995) and Kau and
Keenan (1995). Typically these papers consider a loan “defaulted”
when the mortgage is terminated through foreclosure or other adverse
means.
3 Another line of literature looks at the time from a default, which is typically
defined as being 90+ days delinquent, to resolution of the mortgage.
Resolution could include many of the available loss mitigation tools
used by lenders such as foreclosure, curing, pre-foreclosure sale or
short sale, or even assumption of the mortgage. While some
theoretical work has been done most of the work focuses on empirical
determinants of the various possible outcomes, typically using
multinomial logit in a hazard style framework (Ambrose and Capone,
1996, 1998; Geppert and Karels, 2001; Lambrecht, Perraudin, &
Satchell, 2003; Lawrence and Arshadi, 1995; Phillips and Rosenblatt,
1997; Wang, Young, & Zhou, 2002; Weagley, 1988).
4 While default has been defined in many different ways, in the empirical
work explained in the following sections default is defined as whenever
the lender initiates foreclosure proceedings (the acceleration note) or
the lender becomes the owner of the property which will be sold to
help cover any losses associated with the default and period of
delinquency.
5 See Koppelman and Wen (1998) and Hunt (2000) for an explanation of the
different formulations of the nested logit model.
6 We estimated the multinomial logit model in addition to the nested logit
model and found several differences in the relationships implied
between the two.
7 While this line of reasoning is commonly used to motivate the importance of
equity in a home, it is only valid to the extent that lenders do not
attempt to recover losses on defaulted loans from other assets the
borrower may have (recourse or deficiency judgment lending).
Ambrose et al. (1997) show in their model that when a lender has full
recourse and fully exercises it that borrowers have no incentive to
default.
8 Future research needs to focus on measuring the time to default and the
extent that redemption is actually used by lenders to see if the nonlinear relationship does exist in empirical models.
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Fig. 1. Nested logit model of mortgage loan performance.

Table 1. Summary statistics for variables in the database
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Note that the growth in house prices is calculated from loans purchased by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac and therefore, will include very few subprime transactions. If
housing purchased with subprime loans appreciate at a different rate than housing
purchased with prime loans then the results may be biased.
b See Dreiman and Pennington-Cross (2004) for a discussion of the variance and
dispersion issues surrounding repeat sales house price indices.
a
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Table 2. Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption

Note: The tests were performed using the mlogtest function in Stata. The Hausman
test has 48 degrees of freedom and the Small-Hsiao test has 12 degrees of freedom.

Table 3. One standard deviation elasticity estimates

This table represents the percent change (not percentage points) in the probability of
the event occurring holding all other variables at their means. The last three variables
are indicators or dummy variables and report the percent change in the event
occurring if the loan has a prepayment penalty relative to not having a prepayment
penalty, or is low doc relative to full documentation, or is no doc relative to full
documentation.
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Appendix A. Nested logit coefficient and standard error
estimates
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Appendix B. Sensitivity tests

Fig. B1. Credit scores (FICO). FICO = consumer credit score at origination.
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Fig. B2. LTV at origination. LTV= loan to value ratio at origination.
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Fig. B3. Change in house prices. Change in house prices = percent change in
house prices since origination.
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Fig. B4. House price confidence (standard error of individual house price).
Standard error of individual house price = diffusion estimate of individual
house prices around the index estimate, as it relates to months since the date
of origination.
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Fig. B5. Stability of house prices (variance of the detrended house price
index). Variance of the detrended house price index = variance estimated
from the standard deviation of the difference between actual and 4-period
moving average of house price change.
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Fig. B6. Change in interest rates. Change in interest rates = the change in
30-year fixed-rate interest rates from the date of origination.

Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 60, No. 1/2 (January/February 2008): pg. 67-90. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

31

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Fig. B7. Trigger events (unemployment rate). Unemployment rate = the
state level unemployment rate in the previous month.
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Fig. B8. Baseline (age of loan). Age of loan = the number of months the loan
has survived.
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